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The Production of Terrorism in Pakistan: 






Does intervention in religious market produce negative externalities? To explore this 
question, firstly, I market for religious products secondly, I provide a chronological discussion 
on the consequences of government interventions in the market of religion in Pakistan. It is 
argued that an oligopolistic market for religion exists in Pakistan, thus, it is regulated over time 
by both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Furthermore, it is discussed that the main 
intent of regulations in the religious market of Pakistan was the appropriation of rent by three 
players, that is, religious sect(s), incumbent governments, and cold war allies of Pakistan. 
However, these interventions produced negative externalities over space and time while 
polarising religious sects and sub-sects. Over the years, these spillovers are realised in the form 
of sectarian violence which slowly and gradually transformed into an extreme form of conflict, 
i.e., terrorism. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The prevailing debate about the roots of terrorism in Pakistan emphasises the    
religious aspect, i.e., sectarianism, which is comprehensively studied through the theories 
of anthropology, sociology, political science, law and international relations [Zaman 
(1998); Nasr (2000a,b); Stern (2000); Nasr (2002); Haleem (2003); Khan (2003); Abbas 
(2004); Nasr (2004); Grare (2007); Malik, et al. (2007); Palmer and Palmer (2007); 
Waseem, et al. (2010); Murphy (2012); Riedel (2012)]. Political scientist, Nasr (2000b), 
defines sectarianism in the following words: “Sectarianism in the Pakistani context refers 
specifically to organised and militant religiopolitical activism, whose specific aim is to 
safeguard and promote the sociopolitical interests of the particular Muslim sectarian 
community, with which it is associated. Its discourse of power promises empowerment to 
that community in tandem with greater adherence to Islamic norms in public life, as the 
religious sources and authorities of that community articulate them. These goals are to be 
achieved through mobilisation of the sectarian identity in question and the 
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marginalisation of the rival sectarian community, largely through prolific use of 
violence.” Thus, the objective of this paper is to study the roots of terrorism through 
market and intervention perspectives. In particular, I analyse how economic incentives in 
the religious market motivate and mobilise different players to produce violence, either 
directly or indirectly, over space and time. 
While emphasising economic incentives, this paper provides an alternative 
explanation to the origin of sectarian conflict and terrorism in Pakistan. A market 
perspective of religion has been exploited as an analytical framework to explain 
economically motivated interactions among different players which lead to the production 
of sectarian violence and terrorism over time.
1
 It is argued that the religious market 
framework provides useful insights on the origin of sectarianism and terrorism as an 
oligopolistic market exists to produce different religious products in Pakistan. 
In this context, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to define Islamic 
religious product(s) and its market explicitly. That is, what is the product available for the 
exchange?; what is the price of the transaction?; how is the price determined?; what are 
the available substitutes and complements of religious goods and services?; what is the 
nature of the market? 
Since the seminal contribution of Iannaccone (1992), researchers have considered 
religious practices as rational and adherents as utility maximisers. For instance, religious 
organisations provide consumption smoothing technologies to followers [Hungerman 
(2005); McCleary and Barro (2006); Dehejia, et al. (2007)]; greater levels of religious 
participation are associated with greater level of reported happiness [Johnson, et al. 
(2002)]; a lower probability of committing crimes or engaging in risky behaviour [Gruber 
and Hungerman (2006)]; and greater level of educational attainment [Iannaccone, et al. 
(1997)]. Similarly, like other economic markets, religious market is also exposed to 
government interventions. 
To analyse the research question in the context of economic incentives and market 
framework, it is instructive to shed some light on the dynamics of religion in Pakistan. 
Pakistan is a religiously homogeneous country having 96 percent Muslim population 
[ARDA (2014)]. On the one hand, religion was used as an identity in the creation of 
Pakistan in 1947, assumed to provide norms, morality, social legislation and an inner 
constitution of ethics and compliance to the nation. Thus, it played a significant positive 
role over the years. Social scientists acknowledge this role in words like “Pakistan: A 
resilient/hard country [Stewart (2012); Jaffrelot (2015)].” On the other hand, religion 
became an institution of rent-seeking for legislators, clergies, civil and military 
bureaucracies and foreign allies of Pakistan. To appropriate rent, religion is continuously 
regulated over time by both democratic and non-democratic governments.
2
 A significant 
number of constitutional articles are related to the structure of the religious market. Still, 
the market is enriched over space and time with different sects and sub-sects within the 
Muslims’ faith. 
 
1A religious market refers to a place where religious producers interact with consumers within a market 
framework. Economics of religion frames religion as a product and those who practice with any particular religion 
as a consumer [Sherkat and Wilson (1995)]. 
2Islam is the official religion of Pakistan. There are various articles and clauses in the constitution regarding 
Muslim’s faith, practice and preaching of the religion [Pakistan (2012)]. 
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Government regulations in the religious market is not a new phenomenon. These 
have been frequently practiced throughout history. In the contemporary world, on one 
side, there are countries where a specific religion has been given the monopoly power; 
while on the other side, a large number of states treat all religions with homogeneous 
rules and regulations [Yang (2010)].
3
 Pakistan belongs to the former category of 
countries, where one religion has been given an official status. According to the study of 
Grim and Finke (2006), Pakistan was among the top twenty countries where religion was 
highly regulated.
4
 An extensive literature is available on the effects of government 
(de)regulations on religious participation, religious activities, human behaviour and 
welfare effects [Posner (1987); Olds (1994)].5 
In this context, the following regulations are considered the most significant in 
Pakistan’s religious market. In the education sector, government has introduced 
Islamic Study as a compulsory course and invested in the religious schools 
(Madrassas) [Malik (1989); Nasr (2000a); Murphy (2012)]. On the fiscal side, 
Islamic mandatory charity and taxes (Zakat and Ushr) were imposed. In the judiciary, 
punishment for serious crimes, including theft, robbery and rape under the common 
law were replaced by the so called Islamic punishment. Nevertheless, 
explanation/interpretation of these regulations under the Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Sharia Law) is provided through Hanafi’ite jurisprudance. This school differs on 
social, religious and economic aspects from other schools of Islamic jurisprudence, 
which have millions of followers in Pakistan.
6
 
It is argued that the main intent behind interventions in the religious market of 
Pakistan is the appropriation of rent by different players. Religious sect(s) received 
rents from the government in the form of investment in their religious schools, 
mosques and extended their role to the judicial institution. In return, they supported 
the prevalent government(s), specifically, the coup and helped (in different forms) the 
afghan fighters against the former Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan. The 
governments, specifically, the dictatorships, backed the regulations to strengthen 
their domestic legitimacy. And foreign allies provided funds to the government to 
utilise its role in the cold war through religious institutions. For instance, the 
government provided support to Afghan fighters against the invasion of the former 
Soviet Union with the financial, strategic and technical support of the allies. 
However, the rent backed interventions in the religious market produced negative 
externalities. Over the years, these externalities are realised in the form of sectarian 
violence which slowly and gradually transformed into an extreme form of conflict, 
that is, terrorism.  
 
3Yang (2010) studied that 84 countries have declared an official religion while 56 nations 
treat all religions equally. 
4The Grim and Finke (2006) study sample size consists of 196 countries. 
5Levin (2010) provides a comprehensive literature review about religious activities, health 
outcomes and well-being. 
6The Hanafi’ite school is one of the three schools of law within the Sunni Islam. Ibn-i-Khaldun 
defines the Sunni schools as three: the Hanafi’ite school representing reason, the Zahir’ite school 
representing tradition and a middle school encompassing the Shafi’ite, Malik’ite and Hanbal’ite schools 
[Goldziher (1971)]. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow: Related literature on the causes of   
terrorism is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses a general economic theory of the 
religious market while Section 4 applies the theory to the religious market of Pakistan. 
The constitutional articles and resultant regulations are explained in Section 5. Section 6 
deals with the unintended hazards of government interventions. Finally, Section 7 
concludes the study. 
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE ON THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM  
The determinants which could affect the cost-benefit matrices of a terrorist include 
economic, political, institutional and demographic factors. In this context, several 
hypotheses have been presented and tested to understand the causes of terrorism [Krieger 
and Meierrieks (2011)].
7
 These hypotheses are briefly explained below with a summary 
of the relevant research in Table 1. 
The most extensive research has been carried out on the ‘economic’ causes 
(poverty and inequality) of terrorism. Are poor societies more prone to terrorists? 
Conflicting evidence about economic causes has been provided while considering 
different time periods and   regions. Political economists have also studied the role of 
‘modernisation’ in the promotion of terrorism. They argue that new forms of lifestyle 
and communication, urbanisation and higher population density may attract more 
terrorist attacks, because, these may challenge traditional elements of a society. 
Again, mixed empirical support has been found about modernisation being a trigger 
for terrorist activities. This literature further focuses on the role of ‘liberal vs. non-
liberal’ economic and political institutions as determinants of terrorist incidents. 
Liberal democracies are less prone to terrorism as they provide an alternative way of 
raising voice to disenfranchised segments of a society. Empirical results show that 
once the regression controls for the liberalisation component of the ‘institutional 
order,’ the effect of economic conditions become insignificant on terrorism. Relating 
to this, studies found a non-linear relationship between the type of political set up 
‘democracy vs. dictatorship’ and terrorist activities. Nevertheless, inconclusive 
results have been observed. Furthermore, the role of ‘ethnic and religious 
fractionalisation’ has also been studied, but an ambiguous effect on terrorist incidents 
has been found. Lastly, significant contagious effects of terrorism in both space and 
time have been observed, that is, terrorist activities cluster over space and time. In 
short, concrete evidence has been found in the literature that terrorism is more likely 
to emerge in highly populated, non-democratic and instable countries. 
Similarly, political economists provide facts and figures that terrorism in Pakistan 
has its root in the ‘identity conflict,’ including both ethnic and religious fractionalisation. 
However, few recent studies have found that ‘economic conditions’ also matter for 
terrorists in    Pakistan. Thus, the current study adds to this literature while arguing that 
the root cause of violence and terrorism lies in the regular intervention of government in 
the religious market of Pakistan. 
 
7Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) provide a comprehensive overview on different hypotheses 
that link socio-economic and political factors to terrorism. 
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Table 1 
 Determinants of Terrorism 
Hypothesis Potential Determinant Positive Effect No/Negative Effect 
Economic 
Deprivation 
Economic Conditions Krueger and Maleckova (2003); 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, et al. (2006); 
Plumper and Neumayer (2010); 
Freytag, et al. (2011) 
Blomberg and Hess (2005); 
Azam and Delacroix (2006); Lai 






Krueger and Maleckova (2003); 
Burgoon (2006) 
Azam and Delacroix (2006); 






Eubank and Weinberg (2001) Krueger and Maleckova (2003); 
Burgoon (2006); Piazza (2008); 
Plumper and Neumayer (2010) 
Eubank and Weinberg (2001) 
Political 
Transformation 
Political Stability Lai (2007); Piazza (2008) Blomberg and Hess (2005) 
Identity 
Conflict 
Religion, Minorities Piazza (2008) Blomberg and Hess (2005); 
Azam and Delacroix (2006); 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, et al. (2006); 
Azam and Thelen (2008) 
Global Order Economic Integration, 
International Politics 
Freytag, et al. (2011); Burgoon 
(2006) 
 
Contagion Geography, Time Blomberg and Hess (2005); 
Enders and Sandler (2005); Lai 
(2007); Piazza (2007); Plumper 
and Neumayer (2010)  













Nasir, et al. (2011)  
Identity 
Conflict 
Religion, Minorities Zaman (1998); Nasr (2000b); 
Stern (2000); Grare (2007); 
Asal, et al. (2008); Fair, et al. 
(2010, 2013) 
 
Indicators used for hypothesis: Economic Deprivation: Per capita GDP, poverty or inequality; Modernisation 
Strain: Inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, urbanisation, population growth, size, structure or age; 
Institutional Order: Economic freedom, property rights protection, civil liberties, political rights, literacy or 
school attainment; Political Transformation: Regime stability, conflicts or civil war; Identity Conflict: Religious 
fractionalisation, ethnic or linguistic fractionalisation; Global Order: Trade openness, terms of trade, FDI, 
foreign aid, incidences of conflict or alliances; and Contagion: Spatial, climate, elevation, latitude or temporal 
proximity to terrorism. 
 
3.  ECONOMIC THEORY OF RELIGIOUS MARKET 
Should the government seek a free or monopolised religious market? For the 
first time, this question was raised by Adam Smith in his famous book The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Smith inquired whether optimality in the religious market requires 
establishing (state funded) monopoly churches or competitive religions. Smith 
advocated a free religious market and argued that the objective of self-interest 
motivates a religious scholar (the clergy) as it does in secular markets and firms. He 
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further added that the benefits of competition, the burdens of monopoly and the 
hazards of government regulations are as real in the religion as in any other sector of 
the economy. Smith holds: 
“The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more   
adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candor and moderation which are 
so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, who [as a result of legal 
entry restrictions facing competing sects] ... see nothing round them but followers, 
disciples and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect find themselves almost 
alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect; and the concessions 
which they would mutually find in both convenient and agreeable to make one to another 
might in time, probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and 
rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture or fanaticism ... This 
plan of ecclesiastical government, or more properly, of no ecclesiastical government, 
[would tend to be] productive of the most philosophical good temper and moderation 
with regard to every sort of religious principle [p. 332; emphasis added] [Smith (1845)].” 
Smith presented the argument that if more than one religious sects compete with 
each other for resources and members, the clergies of each sect will challenge the 
adversaries and provide high quality of moral standards and beliefs at low prices. 
Furthermore, Smith emphasises the importance of a larger number of sects like different 
number of producers in a secular market. He mentioned the importance of a larger 
number of small sects as: 
“The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and 
troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the 
whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each 
acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be 
altogether innocent, where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps, 
into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to 
disturb the public tranquility. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on 
all sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candor and 
moderation which are so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, 
whose tenets [are] supported by the civil magistrate (p. 332).”  
Similarly, Coase (1974) argued that “in the market for goods, government 
regulation is desirable whereas, in the market for ideas (speech, writing and the exercise 
of religious beliefs), government regulations are undesirable and should be strictly 
limited. The government, if it attempted to regulate the market for ideas, would be 
inefficient and it’s motives would, in general, be bad, so that, even if it were successful in 
achieving what it wanted to accomplish, the results would be undesirable.” 
On one side, Smith and Coase advocated a free religious market to promote 
tolerance, peace, ideas and harmony in the society, but on the other side, David Hume 
argued against the competitive religious market and favoured the establishment of 
religion by the state. Hume explained that “in the free and unregulated market, each 
‘ghostly practitioner’ (i.e., preacher) will have an incentive to maximise the number of 
his ‘customers’ by disregarding ‘truth, morals, or decency’ and appealing to the ‘passions 
and credulity of the populace.’ It is necessary for the state to regulate this competition in 
order to protect the ‘political interests of the society’.”8 Hume further added that a state 
 
8 See Anderson (1998) for the reference to David Hume on this point. 
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takes necessary regulatory measures to mute the fanaticism which was associated with 
independent religious sects. Given the definitions/views of Smith and Hume, the 
following sections explain the structure and nature of the religious market in Pakistan. 
 
4.  THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS MARKET 
Behavioural and political economists argue that beliefs shape current and future 
economic decisions of an individual [Benjamin, et al. (2010); Leeson (2012); Basten and 
Betz (2013)].  Beliefs which are subjectively true, objectively, may be true or false.
9
 
Every religious belief has the characteristics of either subjectivity or objectivity, or both. 
Due to the lack of objective evidence, it was a challenge for the economists to explicitly 
define religious product and it’s market.10 However, in the last two decades, economists 
have extended the tools of market to study different aspects of religion. Religion has been 
viewed from the market perspective  since the seminal work of Iannaccone (1992). In this 
context, this is the first study to explicitly define Islamic religious product(s) and its 
market. For instance, what is the product available for the exchange?; what is the price of 
the transaction?; how is the price determined?; what are the available substitutes and 
complements of religious goods and services?; what is the nature of the market? Given 
these questions, this section explains the market characteristics of the Muslims’ faith in 
general and in Pakistan in particular. 
A bundle of commodities is available for the exchange in the Islamic religious 
market. I term the set of products, Islamic or Sharia Law. There are some goods and 
services in the set of Sharia law which are subjectively true, but objectively lack scientific 
proofs. Examples include prayers, rituals, beliefs on God, heaven, hell, the day of 
judgment, and life after death. The opportunity cost of consuming such products is the 
time forgone which would otherwise be available for the labour market and consumption 
of secular products. Furthermore, Sharia law includes commodities which are not only 
subjectively true but also possess evidence of objectivity. For instance, laws of 
inheritance, marriage, divorce, child custody, financial transactions, and property rights. 
The opportunity cost includes not only time spent on production and consumption but 
also tangible costs in the form of income and wealth forgone. For example, beliefs on 
fiscal (Zakat) and monetary (risk sharing, i.e., prohibition of interest) systems [El-Gamal 
(2006); Vogel and Hayes (1998)], property rights, contract enforcement, government 
intervention and laws related to crime and punishment, inheritance, marriage, and divorce 
[Nomani and Rahnema (1994)]. To explain this idea further, consider the following 
application. In the money market, borrowing and lending is backed by real variables 
(gold, silver and land related property) to avoid nominal bubbles. Similarly, profit and 
losses are shared by both parties in the transaction to minimise moral hazard and adverse 
selection.
11
 These transactions not only involve time but also money in exchange. 
Furthermore, different prices prevail in the Islamic religious market, depending on the 
nature of goods and services, i.e., tangible vs. non-tangible. 
 
9The objectively false beliefs lack scientific support. Leeson (2012) called them superstition. 
10Maloney, et al. (2010) define religion as a good having three components: 
    (1) private satisfaction, which includes hope for an afterlife; 
    (2) public camaraderie, which includes joint consumption of public goods, especially charitable works; and 
    (3) reputation, respect and social networking. 
11For a detail discussion, see Kettell (2011). 
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The rules and regulations applicable to the Islamic religious market depend on the   
interpretation of Sharia law. For instance, one school of Islamic jurisprudence 
(Hanafi’ite) explains distribution of resources (Zakat) through government, while the 
other (Jafari’ite) argues in favour of individual freedom in the distribution of income 
[Talbot (2009); Powell (2009)]. The former gives a major role to the government in 
distribution, while the latter relies on the efficiency of market forces. Each and every 
individual compares the costs and benefits of different interpretations and decides which 
jurisprudence to follow.
12
 The substitute for a product is the different commodity 
introduced by a competitive jurisprudence with slightly different characteristics. 
 
4.1.  The Religious Market in Pakistan 
Violence and terrorism in Pakistan are often correlated with sectarianism rather 
than with socio-economic and political institutions [Zaman (1998); Nasr (2000b); Stern 
(2000); Grare (2007); Asal, et al. (2008); Fair, et al. (2010, 2013)]. Although, sectarian 
conflict and terrorism are explained through religious intolerance and extremism in 
Pakistan, nevertheless, there is a dearth of scholarship about the structure and function of 
the religious market. Thus, this study is also an attempt to fill this gape. 
 
4.1.1.  The Constitutional Provision of Religion 
Being a predominantly Muslim country, the effects of religion can be seen in 
different constitutional articles and clauses of Pakistan [ARDA (2014)]. However, the 
nature and structure of the religious market (free vs. monopoly) is ambiguous in the 
constitution. Article 2 explicitly states that, “Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.” 
If one focuses only on this article, it could be interpreted that there should be a state 
sponsored monopolised religion. If we read like this, then the question arises, which 
interpretation (jurisprudence) of the Sharia law should be implemented in Pakistan? What 
jurisprudence explanation of the Sharia will be acceptable to the majority? As we know, 
there are different Muslim sects and sub-sects in Pakistan. Although, the fundamenatal 
interpretation of the Sharia is same, there may be differences on various social, economic 
and religious issues. To clarify this ambiguity, the constitution further contains the 
provision that every sect is free to practice its religion according to its own interpretation. 
Thus, article 22 (2a) allows a free market for every religious denomination. According to 
the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), religious education is not regulated 
or controlled by the state of Pakistan [ARDA (2014)].  
 
4.1.2.  Does a Religious Monopoly Exist in Pakistan? 
If we consider the proportion of followers of a belief, Islam is the dominant 
religion in Pakistan. According to the 1998 census: 96.28 percent are Muslims, 1.59 
percent are Christians, 1.60 percent are Hindus, 0.47 percent are Scheduled Castes and 
0.07 percent are others [Pakistan (1998)]. If we further analyse denominational shares in 
the total population, which will give us an idea about the proportion of followers of each 
 
12The preferences for a specific jurisprudence changes overtime when a new interpretation of the Islamic 
jurisprudence comes to the market. People continuously compare the costs and benefits of their decisions about 
rituals and tangible products. 
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sect. According to different sources, two main sects (Sunni and Shi’ite) constitute 70-75 
percent and 20-25 percent of the total followers, respectively. Around 95 percent of the 
customers belong to these two sects which constitute a duopoly market with unequal 
shares. Due to  unequal shares, the market of religion has experienced government 
interventions over the years. 
According to the basic microeconomic theory, a duopolist market leads to inefficient 
outcomes if the two players collude on prices or output. To correct the inefficiency, it needs 
government regulations. This is also similar in the case of the religious market, as pointed out 
by Barro and McCleary (2005): in an unregulated religious market, a natural monopoly can 
arise. Nevertheless, Bainbridge and Stark (1987) follow Smith’s theory of competition and 
argue that a religious monopoly occurs only if a government involves in coercive behaviour 
on behalf of the religion. Furthermore, a strong concentration of followers in a particular 
religion promotes a religious natural monopoly [Barro and McCleary (2005)]. The collective 
nature of participation and religious beliefs are important reasons to create a religious 
monopoly [Iannaccone (1992)]. When more individuals adhere to a religion, the higher 
number of people dispose toward its doctrine. Similarly, Bainbridge and Stark (1987) argue 
that a centralised authority of the state can use its legitimate power to enforce the state 
sponsored monopolised religion in a pluralistic market, if it were allowed without the 
intervention of the government. 
Nonetheless, this is not the case in Pakistan. The political demand for an 
independent state led to the existence of a natural monopoly of the Muslims. After the 
independence of Pakistan in 1947, the natural distribution of different sects was such that 
it resulted in the monopoly of the one specific jurisprudence. However, Rehman (2015) 
discusses that there are more than 100 sects and subsects in today’s Pakistan. Therefore, 
the market structure can be described as oligopoly.    
 
5.  LEGAL SHOCKS TO THE RELIGIOUS MARKET  
AND RENT-SEEKING 
This section discusses the history of government interventions in the religious 
market of Pakistan. It also provides evidence about incentives (public vs. private) to 
intervene in the relgious market. 
 
5.1.  The Second Amendment 
The 1973 constitution declared Pakistan a religious state and allowed a free market 
for every denomination. Nonetheless, the first regulation on religion was introduced 
within a year by the then democratic government. It is implemented through the Second 
Amendment, that explicitly defines the word Muslim. The amendment declared a specific 
religious faction to be non-Muslim and minority.
13
 
Theologically, the Second Amendment might be correct, since one of the sects 
does not accept the most fundamental principle of the Islamic faith.
14
  However, it was 
 
13To become a Muslim, one must accept that Muhammad (PBUH) is the last Prophet of God. Chapter 
33, verse 40 of Qur’an explains “Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the (Prophetic) 
Messenger of Allah (God) and the Last of the Prophets; and Allah (God) has full knowledge of all things.” 
14Interested readers can find more details on the specified sect on http://www.pakistani.org/ 
pakistan/constitution/amendments/2amendment.html  
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the first attempt to regulate the market which provided a rent-seeking opportunity to 
different players (government and religious sects) in the religious market. The 
amendment legalised and institutionalised violence against the banned sect [Khan 
(2003)], which was the starting point of the sectarian violence in Pakistan. 
At the time of the Second Amendment, the de jure political power with the 
religious denominations was insignificant, nevertheless, the de facto power with them 
was significantly high. The main reason was the religious homogenised society. There is 
considerable evidence that for the rent-seeking groups, a homogeneous polity is easier to 
exploit [Lipset (1959)].
15
 Therefore, the religious players used their de facto power of 
persecution and violence which pulled out one of their competitors from the market. 
Similarly, the intervention led to religious rent-seeking behaviour in Pakistan. It was an 
example of the rent-seeking via non-price competition where the competitors, whose 
fundamental beliefs coincided with each other, forced the government to raise the barriers 
of entry into the market [Boudreaux (1989)]. Furthermore, implications and externalities 
of non-price competition have been observed within the few years in the form of dictator 
Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation amendments. 
 
5.2.  The Islamisation Amendments 
General Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977-August 1988) had promulgated a series of 
ordinances in 1979 to Islamise legal, fiscal and monetary institutions of Pakistan. These 
amendments broadly include provisions of the Hudood ordinance (punishment for serious 
crimes under the Sharia Law); elimination of the Riba (interest-free banking); the 
introduction of profit and loss sharing schemes; establishment of the federal Sharia Court 
and the Ushr and Zakat (Islamic taxes) ordinances. The detailed chronology of the 
amendments is illustrated in Table 2. 
In these amendments, the most debatable is the Hudood Ordinance. Hudood
16
 
ordinances replaced Pakistan’s Penal Code offenses based on the Common Criminal 
Law procedures with the laws based on the Hanafi’ite jurisprudence. As a 
consequence, punishment for theft, consumption of intoxicants (alcohol), extra-
marital sex (fornication) and making false allegations of adultery are replaced by the 
so called Islamic criminal laws.
17
 The explanation of Hudood was limited to the 
jurisprudence of the Muslim scholar Abu-Hnifa which was rejected by the followers 
of competitive schools’ jurisprudences. A significant scholarship has been written in 
favour of and against Hudood Ordinances [Kennedy (1992); Cipriani (1993); Polk 
(1997); Quraishi (1997);   Hussain (2006); Weaver (2006); Lau (2007); Mustafa and 
Cheema (2008); Imran (2013)].  
 
15Although, religion in Pakistan homogenises the society, however, in the electoral 
history of Pakistan, religious parties never won a simple majority. In the 1970 general election, 
three religious parties had won only 18 out of 300 general seats [PILDAT (2013)]. 
16Hudood is an Arabic word, literal meaning ‘limit’ or ‘restriction.’ 
17Hudood includes Offenses Against Property Ordinance (prohibiting theft); Prohibition 
Order (prohibiting the consumption of intoxicants); Offence of Zina Ordinance (prohibiting 
adultery and fornication); and Offence of Qazf Ordinance (prohibiting false allegations of 
adultery) [Punjab Police ( 1979)]. 
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Table 2 
General Zia-ul-Haq Constitutional Amendments 
No. Name and Date of Institutional Change Type of Action Purpose 
1. Taking coup (July, 1977) Constitution suspended Imposed martial law and civilian 
government dethroned 
2. The Formation of a body by the Council 
of Islamic Ideology (November, 1977) 
The establishment of an 
organisation 
To formulate recommendations 
for the Islamisation Programme 
3. Empowering Supreme Court to Declare 
Un-Islamic Laws null and void (January, 
1978) 
Ordinance To Islamize the laws 
4. New Education Policy (October, 1978) Ordinance To enhance the Islamic principles 
in education based on the Islamic 
Ideology 
5. Enforcement of Islamic Laws regarding 
rape, adultery and Prohibition of Wine 
(December, 1978) 
Hudood Ordinance To transform the punishments for 
these crimes with those prescribed 
in Islamic Sharia 
6. The Establishment of Sharia Benches in 
Superior 
Ordinance To deal the cases in courts 
according to the laws in Sharia 
 Courts (February, 1979)   
7. More Islamic Laws for Murder, Theft 
and Robbery (December, 1979) 
Ordinance Again, to transform the 
punishments for these crimes with 
those prescribed in Islamic Sharia 
8. Zakat and Usher Ordinance and the 
Elimination of Usury (June, 1980) 
Ordinance To empower the government to 
deduct 2.5% Zakat annually from 
mainly interest-bearing saving 
accounts and shares schemes 
9. The Establishment of the Federal Sharia 
Court (May 1980) 
Ordinance To examine and decide the 
question whether or not any law 
or provision of law is repugnant to 
the injunctions of Islam 
10. Interest-Free Accounts in Banks 
(January, 1981) 
Ordinance To allow Pakistan’s all nationalised 
commercial banks to offer 
profit/loss sharing accounts 
11. Provincial Constitutional Order (March, 
1981) 
Ordinance The order provides for the 
appointment of a federal council 
(Majlis-i-Shoora) consisting of 
such persons as President may, by 
order, determine. It was equivalent 
to Parliament in modern 
democratic systems 
12. Blasphemy Laws (1980, 1982, 1986) Ordinances To set the disrespect to Muhammad 
(PBUH), Ahl-e-Bait (family of the 
Prophet), Sahaba (companions of 
the Prophet) and Sha’ar-i-Islam 
(Islamic symbols) as offenses 
13. Article 58/2-B (November, 1985) Constitutional 
amendment amend- 
To give the discretionary power to 
the President to dismiss the Prime 
Minister, the elected government 
or the Parliament 
14. Validation of the above Ordinances 
(November, 1985) 
Constitutional Act, 1985 
(8th Amendment) 
All the above changes were passed 
by Majlis-i-Shoora (Parliament) and 
signed by the President 
Source:  Khan(2013). 
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Nevertheless, the basic purpose of the intervention was to achieve legitimacy for the 
dictator’s government. To get the support of the main sect and its sub-sects in Pakistan, 
the then president, general Zia-ul-Haq had designed constitutional amendments based on 
the Hanafi’ite jurisprudence [Khan (2013)]. 
General Zia’s intervention in the religious market was a situation of two-way 
religious rent-seeking behaviour. From the government party, Zia was lobbying to 
remain in the power undemocratically, which could not have been possible if the 
dominant religious player/sect was not supporting him. From the producer side, the 
relevant sect was trying to expand their religious share to the political, fiscal and 
judicial institutions and markets. Thus, the religious sect(s) exploited this 
opportunity by supporting the dictator in return for the constitutional 
amendments.
18
 Once again, main relgious sect(s) colluded with the dictator to 
restrict the influence of competive players (sects) in the market through legal 
interventions [Talbot (2009)].  
 
6.  HAZARDS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
This section discusses how religious amendments created a sense of confrontation 
among different religious sects. First, it examines how religious violence correlated with 
the amendments in the short run and transformed into sectarian violence in the medium 
term. Then, it explains, how sectarian violence is converted to terrorism between sects 
and within a sect in the longer period. 
 
6.1.  The Short Run Hazards 
The immediate reaction in the religious market came from sects who do not 
follow Hanafi’ite jurisprudence. They strongly objected to the Zakat tax and argued 
that it is against their beliefs to have the state involved in the distribution of 
resources. They politically mobilised thousands of their customers/followers against 
government intervention. Although, Zia eventually withdrew and exempted those 
sect(s) from the Zakat, this event accentuated differences between the two main sects 
in Pakistan [Nasr (2000a)]. 
Followers of Jafari’ite school of thought were suspicious of the state 
patronisation and enforcement of a particular jurisprudence in the religious market, 
and came forward to protect their religious principles, norms and values. 
Nevertheless, government allied sect(s) strongly reacted to the government’s 
exemption of some sect(s) from the Zakat tax. Their hardcore sub-sects targeted each 
others’ religious processions, mosques, leaders and professionals. In reaction, both 
main sects of Pakistan created their respective militant groups. This reaction with the 
formation of radical militant groups, unfortunately, led to the competition on 
violence between competitive sects in the religious market. Initially, it was converted 
to the market of violence. Thus, the future outcomes were sectarian violence and 
terrorism [Jackson, et al. (2009)]. 
 
18In the 1977 general election, the three main religious parties had formed an alliance with six other 
parties. The alliance had secured only 36 seats out of 200. Again, the religious parties were unable to get de jure 
power in the parliament [PILDAT (2013)]. 
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6.2.  The Medium Term Hazards 
The lobbying of the religious sects can be seen in the well-known case of the 
Hazoor Bakhsh vs. Federation of Pakistan, Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD), 1981, 
Federal Sharia Court (FSC), 145. The FSC had ruled that the sentence of rajm (stoning to 
death) for zina (fornication) was repugnant to the injunction of the Sharia Law. The FSC 
pointed out that the term Hadd was used in the Qur’an in a sense of restrictions (bounds 
set by Allah). None of these mean a fixed penalty. The court added that it appears from 
the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH) and sayings of his Companions that the word Hadd 
was used in the sense of punishment and not the ‘fixed punishment.’ 
The court judgment was rejected by the followers of Hanafi’ite school of 
jurisprudence. They turned down the FSC ‘interpretation’ as being contrary to the 
Sharia Law and the judges were accused of being ignorant of law, the Islamic 
scripture and jurisprudence. The sect(s) who were not satisfied with the decision, 
lobbied against the dictator through country wide riots and protests. It led to another 
constitutional amendment (President’s Order 5 of 1981), which added three judges 
who were religious scholars and raised the number in the FSC bench to eight. The 
reason for the extra three judges was a direct consequence of complaints by the main 
sect of Pakistan [Lau (2004)]. 
Government intervened in the judiciary institution due to the threat of riots and 
protests from one of the major sects. General Zia had needed support of that sect for the 
political legitimisation, thus, he intervened and made amendments in the FSC. The 
regulation made the government once again non-neutral in the religious market. Both 
players, the religuous sect and the government colluded to maximise rents from the 
collaboration. In the early 1980s, Zia needed support of the specific faction to get 
Jihadies in the Afghan War against the former Soviet Union
19
 and the religious sect(s) 
were struggling for their presence in formal institutions. 
 
6.2.1.  Religious Schools and Rent-Seeking 
According to the Article 22(2) of the constitution, “In respect of any religious 
institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in the granting of 
exemption or concession in relation to taxation.” Although, there is no explicit word for 
the subsidy in the above statement, however, one can interpret that the government will 
not discriminate against any religious institution in the provision of public goods. If the 
government provides concessions, it must treat all sects equally. But it was not the case in 
Pakistan, where governments changed wordings in religious concessions. 
In the 1980s, one of the intiatives of Zia’s Islamisation was the promotion of 
madrassas,
20
 especially of the Hanafi’ite school of thought, to get political 
 
19 For instance, these religious groups had provided and trained enough personnel for the Jihad in 
Afghanistan, aimed at defeating communism with the support of the United States (US), the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) and the United Kingdom (UK) [Khan (2013)]. 
20Pakistan’s madrassas are traditionally linked with the vast network of religious schools that started in 
Baghdad in the beginning of the 11th century. The process of the multiplication of madrassas continued with the 
passage of time owing to differences of the interpretation of the teachings of Qur’an and Hadith. The basic 
structure and system of education are more or less the same. However, since the 11th century till the rise of 
capitalism, madrassas were like modern schools, where, apart from religious texts, science, philosophy, art, 
astronomy, etc., were taught to the students. 
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benefits.21 Moreover, sects of this school were looking for long term investment in the 
promotion of their  religious product and ideology. To get the initial liquid capital, these 
sects and sub-sects turned to the dictator, Zia. Zia was also looking for an investment, 
which could give him long term return. Investment in the promotion of a specific belief 
provided him both short and long term returns and rents. 
Firstly, he successfully prolonged his undemocratic regime, and secondly, he used 
the return from religious investment as an instrument in his foreign policy in the Afghan 
War. Again, Zia kept aside Article 22(2) and intervened with his allies in the religious 
market. The US, UK and the Persian Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates had supported him with financial resources. The government provided a 
share from allies’ funds for the promotion and construction of madrassas, and also 
enabled Islamic parties, social groups and religious scholars to do the same [Nasr 
(2000a)]. Since the 1980s, most of the these madrassas became notable recipients of the 
Zakat funds that the government had collected. In 1984, for instance, 9.4 percent of the 
Zakat funds went to the support of religious schools, benefiting 2,273 madrassas and 
111,050 students [Malik (1989)]. 
 
6.2.2.  Rent-Seeking and Violence 
At the end of 1979, the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan. Few years later, Zia 
with the financial support of the US, UK and Arab monarchs intervened in the religious 
education market and supported religious schools. However, Zia linked the distribution of 
foreign rents to the provision of foot soldiers and sleeping cells to Afghan fighters who 
were fighting against the Soviet army. Therefore, the number of players in the religious 
market increased to three. The rent-seeking players were the hardcore sect(s), 
government (dictator) and foreign allies. Murphy (2012) argued that the rapid growth in 




A major proportion of the state and allies’ funding went to specific hardcore  
sect(s) madrassas [Murphy (2012)]. The concession created a three way rent-seeking 
activity and every party took its share. The international players achieved their share of 
rent when the Soviet Union was pushed back by Afghan fighters, which led to the 
collapse of communism [Reuveny and Prakash (1999)]. Zia’s government received 
external legitimacy and financial assistance from his allies in the form of grants, aid and 
loans. Between 1972 and 1999, 48 percent of total US aid was given to Zia [USAID 
(2014)]. The religious player received unprecedented investment in madrassas, students 
 
21Khan (2013) studied that Zia became the key ally of the US in the Afghan war. The West, especially 
the US and the Arab countries were against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. Khan (2013) further 
explained that Islamisation helped Zia in attaining domestic legitimacy through the support of religious groups 
where the clergies allowed to initiate and conduct Jihadi activities whole heartedly. However, Zia’s Islamisation 
policy had already started in November, 1977, while the Soviet Unin had entered into Afghanistan on December 
24, 1979 (see Table 2). Therefore, in our view, Zia’s Islamisation was to get domestic legitimacy through the 
support of religious groups, not through support for the Jihad. 
22 There were only 900 madrassas in 1971 in Pakistan, but increased to 33,000 (8,000 registered and 
25,000 unregistered) by the end of Zia’s era in 1988. One of the consequences of the large number of 
madrassas, especially the unregistered ones, was that they were strongly divided along sectarian rather than 
intellectual lines [Murphy (2012)]. 
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and followers. The rent-seeking activities on the part of the three players created a social 
cost in the form of sectarian violence. Someone had to internalise this cost. Therefore, the 
citizens of Pakistan were exposed to the hazards of interventions. 
With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan [The Geneva Accord 
(1988)], these hardcore sects who had accumulated financial and human resources went 
behind another competitor in the market. Since it was not possible to stop the competitor 
through legal rules (this school constitutes 15-20 percent of the population [Zaman 
1998)], they turned into violence and effectively utilised its past investment in madrassas 
against that school.
23
 Consequently, these organised sects started to compete in the 
production of violence rather than in moral standards and values. In the Zia’s regime, 
almost every sect invested heavily in militant trainings. Figure 1 shows the increase in the 
production of sectarian violence immediately after Zia’s rule. Unfortunately, we have 
little information available on sectarian violence during Zia’s period and this is limited to 
a specific province. However, theologians, historians and political scientists concluded 
that sectarian violence is produced by Zia’s interventions [Zaman (1998); Nasr (2000b); 
Stern (2000); Grare (2007); Asal, et al. (2008); Fair, et al. (2010, 2013) to mention a 
few]. 
 
Fig. 1.  Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, 1989–2016  
(PIPS, 2014; SATP, 2014) 
 
 
6.3.  The Long Term Hazards: Terrorism 
Before 1979, there were 30 religious organisations of different denominations in 
Pakistan. After the Zia’s Islamisation amendments, a sharp increase in the growth of the 
religious organisations was observed. The number rose to 239 in 2002 [Rana (2011)]. 
 
23Most of the Jihadi organizations were established in the 1980s, the era dominated by Zia’s regime 
Howenstein (2008)]. 
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These figures take into account organisations at the national, regional and provincial 
levels. The number approaches to thousands if small local groups are considered as 
well.
24
 Among the 239 organisations, 24 participated in electoral politics, 148 worked 
purely on the sectarian agenda, 24 became associated with the militant jihad, 12 were 
striving for the establishment of the renewalist/Khalifat movement and shunned 
democratic dispensations, 18 pursued missionary work, mainly preaching their sectarian 
ideas and 10 operated as charities [Rana and Ansari (2006)]. 
Zia’s investment in different sects provided them enough human resources to 
challenge, not only competitive sects but also sub-sects of own jurisprudence and even 
the government. A militant group (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) converted initially into 
violent religious organisation, and gradually achieved a monopoly in violence. Their 
main objective is to capture the religious market through the production of extremism and 
violence. Figures 1 and 2 show sectarian and terrorism incidents in Pakistan. The 
extremists not only targeted their competitive sects but also sub-sects of their own 
jurisprudence. Over time, they diversified their targets from opposite sects to their own 
sect(s). 
Due to political instability in the 1990s, government was unable to fully internalise 
the negative externalities which were created by the Zia’s interventions. To control the 
spillover effect of 1980s policies, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a major step forward 
in efforts to deal with the menace of terrorism.
25
 Nevertheless, the religious market was 
so   polarised at the end of the 1990s that mere laws were not enough to control the social 
costs of sectarian violence and terrorism. Although, there are divergences among the 
objectives of religious, political, sectarian, militant and charitable organisations, the 
commonalities play a significant role in shaping the religious discourse in the country. All 
sects and sub-sects are part of a single discourse and share common objectives. Their 
discourse encourages Islamisation and religiosity in society. These commonalities have 
led to the demand for the Sharia law (based on a narrow interpretation) by extreme 
violent and terrorist groups in Pakistan. For example, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s 
main objective and ideology was the enforcement of the Sharia based on its own narrow 





24There is a trend in Pakistan that every big mosque or madrassa has its own religious organisation. 
They are mainly set up to gain influence in the area, collect donations and organise religious congregations. 
They often formally or informally merge and support the mainstream polity at the regional and national level 
which is in line with their schools of thought. 
25The Preamble of the Anti-Terrorism Act state, “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the prevention 
of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offenses and for matters connected therewith and 
incidental thereto.” 
Section 6 of that Act defined a ‘terrorist act’ in the following terms: “Whoever, to strike terror in the 
people, or any section of the people, or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect harmony 
among different sections of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or 
inflammable substances, or fire-arms, or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals or other 
substances of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or to be likely to cause the death of, or injury to, 
any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies of services 
essential to the life of the community or displays fire-arms, or threatens with the use of force public servants in 
order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties commits a terrorist act.” 
26Interested readers can find the objectives and ideologies of different extremist and terrorist groups at 
SATP (2014). 
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Fig. 2. Terrorism in Pakistan, 1974–2015 [Global Terrorism Database (2016)] 
 
 
7.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper uses a market framework to analyse the implications of government 
regulations in the religious market of Pakistan. It defines a set of commodities which is 
available to customers in the religious market. The set includes both goods and services, 
i.e., rituals and prayers, financial markets and judicial institutions, monetary and fiscal 
policies, property rights and contract enforcement, etc. The religious product is 
differentiated on the basis of different interpretations of the Islamic jurisprudence. The 
commodity of one sect is an imperfect substitute for the comparative denomination. 
Producers in the market are different religious organisations and institutions which follow 
a specific interpretation to produce their products. Consumers are the general public who 
posses religious preferences and demand commodities which satisfy their religious taste. 
The price of a religious product includes the opportunity cost of time, that is, energy and 
resources used during the transaction and consumption processes. 
This analysis shows that an oligopolistic structure exists in the religious market of 
Pakistan. This oligopoly is based on different religious denominations which coexist in 
the market. The number of sects and sub-sects are increasing over space and time. To be 
specific, oligopoly firms compete over the provision of mosques and madrassas to attract 
more followers. Due to the oligopolistic structure, the market forces are not efficient to 
provide different religious commodities including the collection and distribution of Zakat, 
and provision of interest free loans. Thus, government regulated the religious market over 
the years to provide certian religious products. 
The study concludes that the appropriation of rent by the three players—the federal 
government, religious sects and cold war allies of Pakistan—played a significant role in the 
interventions of the religious market. From the government side, domestic legitimacy for a 
political governance was the main factor to back the regulations in the religious market. 
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Both democratic and non-democratic regimes tried to strengthen the domestic legitimacy of 
their respective governments, thus limiting these regulations to Hanafi’ite jurisprudence. 
The sects of this school received rents in the form of investment in their madrassas, 
mosques and congregations in return for support of the government in the cold war. Lastly, 
foreign allies provided funds for investment in the religious market to utilise the return 
against the former Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan. Over time, the regulations 
delivered returns to the relevant players of the market, i.e., government, religious sect(s) 
and international allies. However, they created a social cost to be borne by the society. 
The social costs include riots and violent protests, sectarian violence, and terrorist 
attacks. Over the years, the divisions among different sects have deeply polarised with the 
ensuing competition in the production of violence against each other. This non-price 
negative competition still exists in Pakistan and is intensifying over space and time. 
Nevertheless, few hardcore sects dominated over others in the production of violence 
[Global Terrorism Database (2016); SATP (2014)]. 
The main contribution of this paper is an alternative explanation of the prevailing 
sectarian conflict and terrorism in Pakistan from the religious market perspective. In this 
context, the study discussed the structure of the religious market and the incentives and 
probable consequences of the government interventions in it. Furthermore, it analysed 
that how demand and supply of the religious product(s) interact in the religious market. 
Similarly, it defined the price of the traded religious product(s) from the opportunity cost 
perspective; nevertheless, further research is needed on price determination and its 
mechanism in the Islamic religious market. 
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